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This paper compares income inequality and income mobility in the Scandinavian countries and the United States
during 1980-90. The results suggest that inequality is greater in the United States than in the Scandinavian countries
and that this inequality ranking of countries remains unchanged when the accounting period of income is extended
from one to eleven years. The pattern of mobility turns out to be remarkably similar, in the sense that the proportionate
reduction in inequality from extending the accounting period of income is much the same. But we do ﬁnd evidence of
greater dispersion of ﬁrst differences of relative earnings and income in the United States. Relative income changes
are associated with changes in labor market and marital status in all four countries, but the magnitude of such changes
are largest in the United States.
JEL Key Words: D31 Personal Income and Wealth Distribution1 Introduction
International comparisons of income and earnings distributions suffered until fairly recently from a lack of sufﬁciently
comparable cross-country data. Thanks to the efforts put into the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), such comparisons
have acquired much more credibility, because the researchers behind LIS have invested heavily in bridging gaps in
comparability. Surveys using LIS data, such as Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997), ﬁnd that the Nordic countries are
among the countries with the lowest level of annual income inequality while the United States is among the countries
with the highest. International comparisons of annual and hourly earnings inequality (see e.g. Freeman and Katz,
1995) are based on national data sets that have not been subject to the same kind of standardization as those in LIS,
but yield similar results: the United States has high and the Nordic countries have low levels of inequality.
Many economists, however, question the appropriateness of examining the inequality of single-year incomes (and
earnings) and would rather observe the inequality of permanent income. It has long been recognized that there could
be high annual income inequality even if the inequality of permanent income is very low. The more individuals,
or households, over time move up or down the income ladder, the more single-year inequality will deviate from
the inequality of income measured over a longer period of time. If there are differences in income mobility across
countries, single-year inequality rankings may yield a misleading picture of the long-term income inequality ranking.
Therefore, it is interesting to study cross-country inequality rankings when the accounting period is extended.
There is not, however, complete agreement as to whether income mobility is good or bad (cf. Atkinson et al.,
1992). Those who claim that income mobility is good have argued that it enhances both equity and efﬁciency, in that it
provides economic incentives. Milton Friedman (1962) expressed this view in a passage in Capitalism and Freedom:
A major problem in interpreting evidence on the distribution of income is the need to distinguish two
basically different kinds of inequality; temporary, short-run differences in income, and differences in
long-run income status. Consider two societies that have the same distribution of annual income. In one
there is great mobility and change so that the position of particular families in the income hierarchy varies
widely from year to year. In the other, there is great rigidity so that each family stays in the same position
year after year. Clearly, in any meaningful sense, the second would be the more unequal society. The
one kind of inequality is a sign of dynamic change, social mobility, equality of opportunity; the other of
a status society. The confusion behind these two kinds of inequality is particularly important, precisely
because competitive free-enterprise capitalism tends to substitute the one for the other.
This passage captures many of the arguments that have been raised in favor of income mobility. First, mobility is a
sign of a dynamic and hence more ﬂexible, or efﬁcient, economy. Second, Friedman emphasizes that income mobility
contributes to social mobility or equality of opportunity. No doubt, this is correct in the sense that the income history
1of an individual will not be as important for the future income stream as it would otherwise be. Finally, high income
mobility will, everything else being equal, make the distribution of lifetime income more equal. A counter argument
is that lifetime income is not necessarily a complete measure of inequality. Income mobility often implies income
instability for the individual and his/her household.1 Further, if it is costly for the individual to transfer income from
one period to another and with uncertainty about the future, the income received in a given period will also matter
for the welfare of the individual. Amartya Sen concludes a discussion of the issue by saying that cross-section and
lifetime inequality “supplement each other, reﬂecting two different aspects of it”.2
For these reasons, it is important to compare income inequality across countries based also on longer time periods
than one year and to compare also income mobility across countries. As the LIS has demonstrated, attaining compa-
rability in a single year is a time-consuming and demanding task. Doing so for multi-year studies has only rarely been
attempted.3 Using longitudinal data sets from four countries – Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the United States – the
present study explores the following questions:
1. What is the ordering of countries with respect to inequality of earnings and income, and does this ordering
change when the accounting period is extended from one to several years?
2. What is the ordering of countries with respect to the mobility of earnings and income?
3. Which factors are associated with changes in relative income?
We study the mobility of individuals using three income concepts: individual earnings, family market income and
family disposable income. Data are available for the 1980s. More complete data are available for the 1986–1990
period than for the longer time period, so separate analyses are made for the 1980-90 and for the years 1986 to 1990.
To get some idea of what accounts for individual mobility, we explore the magnitude of changes in relative earnings
(1980-90) and disposable income (1986-90) that are associated with shifts in labor market and marital status using
regression techniques.
A comparison between these Scandinavian countries and the United States is, in our view, particularly relevant.
Because previous studies of annual income (and earnings) inequality have placed the Scandinavian countries at the top
in terms of equality and the United States at the bottom, evidence from these countries is ideal in order to determine
whether there is a tradeoff between inequality of annual income and mobility. There are several reasons to believe that
mobility in the Scandinavian countries differs from that in the United States. The macroeconomic background and the
institutional settings differ between those four countries. Labor market trends and public policies regarding beneﬁts
and taxes inﬂuence the distribution of all three income concepts, both in any given cross-section and dynamically.
The unemployment experience of the four countries differed in many respects in the 1980s. Until the mid-1980s,
unemployment rates high and followed similar time patterns in Denmark and the United States. Norway and Sweden
2also had similar time patterns but low levels of unemployment. In the second period of our analysis, from 1986 to
1990, unemployment was increasing in Denmark and Norway but decreasing in Sweden and the United States. The
distributional impact of unemployment depends on the dynamic structure of unemployment, on the importance of job
tenure for earnings and on the coverage and replacement rates of income transfer schemes. Denmark stands out as
the country having the highest level of long-term unemployment during the period. As job tenure effects are large
in the United States (Topel, 1991), displaced workers will experience a signiﬁcant reduction in post- compared to
pre-unemployment wages. Job tenure effects are small in the Scandinavian countries (Westergård-Nielsen, 1996), so
losses for displaced workers appeared more as the consequence of more unemployed people either leaving the labor
force or being employed temporarily in labor market programs with a compensation lower than the pre-unemployment
wage.
These observations may partly be explained by the much lower wage dispersion and the higher level of the mini-
mum wage in the Scandinavian countries. This is reinforced by the much higher public sector share of employment in
the Scandinaviancountries, as the variancein the earningsdistribution is smaller in the public than in the private sector,
cf. Pedersen et al. (1990) and Zetterberg (1990). Thus, unemployment seems to induce some downward mobility in
the income distribution, but since the earnings distribution is much more compressed in the Scandinavian countries,
the effect is much smaller than in the United States.
Differences in the participation rate among married women are related to differences in the sectoral distribution
of employment. Transition rates between employment and non-participation are lower for married women in the
Scandinavian countries than in the United States OECD (1991). With married women predominantly working in the
public sector – which is more resistant to cyclical shocks – the higher and more stable level of female participation in
the Scandinavian countries tends to stabilize average market income per person in the household.
Finally, the impact from unemployment on disposable income is expected to differ between Scandinavia and the
United States because of the differences in unemployment insurance and social welfare. The Scandinavian unemploy-
ment insurance systems are much more generous in terms of coverage, beneﬁt duration and replacement rates. The
risk of large income losses due to unemployment is small in the Scandinavian countries.
Gottschalk and Mofﬁtt (1994) analyze a number of factors that might explain the increase in earnings instability
found in recent U.S. studies. No single factor emerges as being the most important, but some of the factors they view
as likely candidates for an explanation were present in the Scandinavian countries in the 1980s. This is the case with
the decline in regulation, the disappearance (or decline in the extent) of administered prices and the general increase in
competition. Another factor mentioned by them, the decline in unionization, clearly is irrelevant in the Scandinavian
context.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We give in Section 2 precise deﬁnitions of income concepts, research
3population and time periods. We also present the methods we use in Section 2. Section 3 contains the main results
on inequality and mobility orderings as well as a number of sensitivity analyses. Section 4 presents our approach to
exploring the correlates of income mobility. The main results are summarized and discussed in Section 5.
2 Data and methods
Data
There are a large number of speciﬁc choices to make in a study of this sort, in the making of which the need for
similarity across countries has to be borne in mind. We must specify the time period(s) to cover, the relevant income
receiving unit (individual, family or household) and the appropriate unit of analysis (individual, family or household,
again). We must also decide on what income concepts to study, how to delimit and choose the populations to be
researched, and, depending on what income and analysis units are chosen, we have to specify an (at least implicit)
equivalence scale.
We study the distribution of: (1) earnings of those who had strictly positive earnings in every year; (2) the market
income of individuals over the time period and (3) the disposable income of individuals. We deﬁne earnings, (1), as the
individuals’ earnings plus work-related transfers, such as unemployment insurance, sick pay and part-time pensions.
The restriction to positive earnings is quite standard in the earnings mobility literature (see e.g. Gottschalk and Mofﬁtt,
1994). For (2) and (3), the income receiving unit is the family but the unit of analysis is the individual. Market income
consists of factor incomes. Disposable income is: market income – taxes paid + non-work-related social transfers
excluding social assistance and income in-kind. The exclusion of certain transfers is data-driven. Because we use the
same sample to analyze market income and disposable income, we can use the ﬁrst-order incidence method to examine
the impact of taxes and transfers on income inequality and mobility.
We assign the market (disposable) income per adult member to the individuals we study, rather than (conventional)
equivalent income (deﬁned over all members in the household). For a married couple, we divide the sum of each
spouse’s market (disposable) income by two and assign the resulting number to each spouse. We deﬁne the “family”
to consist of the head and the spouse, if they are married, and of only the individual in all other cases. We ignore
income from other household members, adults and children alike. This means that we also ignore the income of the
partner in a co-habiting couple. This choice is dictated by the need for comparability across countries. We are not
always able to ﬁnd out the structure of the household an individual lives in. For some countries, for some years, we do
not know the number of children in the household, nor do we know the number of other adults. We have, therefore,
settled for the somewhat unconventional solution, described above. To examine the sensitivity of our results to this
choice we conduct also a more conventional analysis for three countries.
4Negative disposable or market incomes are censored at zero in each year.4 The proportions of zero and negative
incomes (available from the authors on request) vary somewhat from country to country and by income concept, but
are at the very largest below 5 percent. All incomes are expressed in 1990 prices in each country’s own currency, using
the consumer price indices. Since it is income inequality, rather than the level of living we are comparing, we have not
used any method for converting domestic currencies into comparable units.
The most important difference to some common practices in our income deﬁnitions is that we gross count capital
income instead of subtracting interest paid on loans. The data sources in the Scandinavian countries dictate that we
include all work-related social transfers, most importantly unemployment beneﬁts, in earnings. Public sector transfers
that are not work-related, but either universal or means-tested, are included in disposable income.
We study two (overlapping) samples in two time periods, namely 1980 to 1990 (Sample 1) and 1986 to 1990
(Sample 2). The main reason to end the sample period as early as 1990 is that a major tax reform took place in
Sweden in 1991, which changed markedly the deﬁnitions of earnings and other income variables (see Björklund et al.,
1995). The samples that we study are as follows. In the ﬁrst period we study individuals born between 1927 and 1951
(Sample 1). The youngest sample members are 29 in 1980 and the oldest are 63 in 1990. In the second period, we
include persons born between 1927 and 1961, which makes the age range 25 to 63 (Sample 2; which thus includes all
those who are in Sample 1 and those born between 1952-1961). These choices are primarily to enable the study of
the working-age population. Also, we want to use consistent age groups within each of the two time periods. For all
samples we only include those who lived in the country during the whole period.
Detailed data descriptions
The Danish data are based on the Longitudinal Data Base (LDB), which is a 5 per cent random sample of the Danish
adult population, covering the years 1976-1990. It has been supplemented with additional observations (mainly from
young generations) during the years in order to keep it representative of the population. The information in the sample
is register based and stems from tax and income registers, unemployment insurance registers, educational registers etc.
administered by the Statistics Denmark. Thus, the sample does not suffer from the traditional types of sample attrition.
The master sample is described in greater detail in Westergård-Nielsen (1985). We use data from two sub-samples of
the LDB. The analysis of earnings uses a random 1 per cent sample of the Danish population. As the earnings data
include only those individuals who had positive wage income or unemployment payments in each of the years, the 1
per cent sample reduces to 11,734 individuals in these calculations. The household sample stems from a 0.5 per cent
random sample of the Danish population.
The annual earnings (lønindkomst) and the unemployment payments (arbejdsløshedsdagpenge) are deﬁned as
the amounts registered by the tax authorities. The registration of earnings is based on the employers’ pay-rolls.
5Unfortunately, for conﬁdentiality reasons, all income variables have been censored at 200,000 DKK for the years
1980-1981. As a consequence, income inequality for these years are underestimated. The income as self-employed or
assisting spouse is not included in the wage income concept. Thus, wage income is not equal to “labor income”. In
the Danish data it is not possible to separate out labor income earned working as self-employed or as assisting spouse.
Household market income (bruttoindkomst) includes wage income, capital income (positive or negative), income
asself-employed or assistingspouse, unemployment insurance paymentsand taxablepublic transfers (public pensions,
public grants for students etc.). Disposable income is calculated as the market income of the family, net of income
taxes, but including some non-taxable transfers. Income taxes are calculated by applying the Danish tax rules for each
of the years on the variable taxable income (skattepligtig indkomst) which is included in the LDB. The public transfers
included in the disposable income concept are child allowances (børnetilskud + børnefamilieydelse) and housing
subsidies to renters (boligsikring). Until 1986, child allowances were means-tested against household income. Child
allowances have been ﬂat rate since 1987 and depend only on the number and the age of the children.
For Norway we use data from Statistics Norway’s Income Distribution Survey (IDS) and Tax Assessment Files
(TAF). These representative data sources are based on ﬁlled in and approved tax reports. The IDS provides detailed
information about reported incomes, legal deductions, taxes paid and transfer payments received. The TAF contains
income from labor and taxes. Our analyses are based on data from 2,047 persons in the IDS and 621804 persons in




og fondsavsetninger) + brutto kapitalinntekt (för fradrag for geldsrenter og underskud i borettslag). Disposable in-
come adds to market income all social transfers and deducts direct taxes, disponibel inntekt = markedsinntekt +
overföringer (ytelser fra folketrygden + tjenestepensjon + livrenter o.l. + bidrag o.l. + barnetrygd + bostötte +
stipendier + försörgerfradrag) - skatt.
All Swedish data are taken from the Level of Living Surveys, a 0.1 percent representative sample of the population
(see Erikson and Åberg, 1987). All income variables that we use originate from tax-based registers, not interviews.
The exact deﬁnition of earnings is inkomst av tjänst – income from labor. This income concept consists of wage
and salary income paid by the employer. In addition, taxable work-related income transfers, such as unemployment
insurance and sickness payments are included, as well as part-time pensions and maternity leave payment. The income
that self-employed get from their business is not included.
Market income adds to earnings other sources of income. These are: (1) capital, (2) own business, (3) real estate
and (4) farm income. The Swedish income concept is sammanräknad inkomst – total income – with the exception
6that we exclude capital gains (Inkomst av tillfällig förvärvsverksamhet) to achieve comparability with the other coun-
tries. Disposable income is obtained by adding the income (market income) of both spouses. From this total factor
income we subtract income taxes and add the largest non-taxable transfers, namely child allowances. We are unable to
include the non-taxable housing allowance (bostadsbidrag) or social assistance (socialbidrag), which are fairly small
compared to the child allowances.
The U.S. data are taken from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) (Morgan et al., 1992). The PSID is a
panel of households that was started in 1968 and consisted at that time of about 5000 households. The most complete
information in the PSID, and the information that we use, is about the household head and the spouse. All information
in the PSID is collected by interviews, mostly by telephone. Validation studies have found the income data in the PSID
to be of quite high quality (see e.g. Bound and Krueger, 1991).
The U.S. data differ in some respects from those available for the other countries. The income data are based
on interviews and (especially non-random) measurement error is likely to be more of an issue. Also, the concept of
disposable income is less complete. For instance, the PSID only has information on federal, not on local or state,
income taxes. We only use information about the head and the spouse, i.e., income from other household members is
ignored. In calculating the various statistics, we use sample weights, the use of which yields population level statistics.
The PSID has complete information on earnings for heads and wives. We use the variables total labor income for
each spouse separately. Unfortunately, this includes the estimated labor part of business income. Wages and salaries,
a variable free of such estimated numbers, is not available for the wife. The estimated part of business income is likely
to increase measurement error and thus leads us to overestimate mobility of earnings in the United States.
We use the PSID variable “total taxable income” of head and wife as our market income. Disposable income is
arrived at by adding non-taxable transfers, such as e.g. Aid to Families with Dependent Children, to market income
and by subtracting taxes from this. Only federal taxes are subtracted. Local and state taxes, however, are quite small
relative to federal.
Measurement of income inequality and income mobility
In general, income inequality is expected to decrease when the accounting period is extended. The extent of inequality
decline depends on the frequency of shifts in relative positions within the annual income distributions as well as on
the magnitude of changes in annual relative incomes. In order to reﬂect this relationship between income mobility and
income inequality, measures of income mobility should depend on the magnitude of the changes in annual incomes
arising from shifts in the individuals’ position over time. Conventional measures of mobility are based on transitions
between deciles or quintiles and lack this property. They are less appropriate measures of income mobility, because
even minor changes in annual incomes may result in frequent shifts between deciles or quintiles, suggesting a high
7degree of mobility.
Shorrocks (1978) introduced as an alternative to the transition matrix approach a family of mobility measures
that incorporates the close relationship between income mobility and income inequality. Mobility is measured as the
relative reduction in the weighted average of single-year inequality when the accounting period is extended. The state
of “no mobility” is deﬁned to occur when relative incomes are constant over time. We deﬁne “no mobility” to occur
if the annual rankings of all individuals are constant over time. With this deﬁnition, there could be no mobility even
if relative incomes change over time. The advantage of this deﬁnition, over that originally proposed by Shorrocks
(1978), is that it allows for a measure of income mobility based on the Gini coefﬁcient.5
Consider a period of T years and let G and µ be the Gini coefﬁcient and the mean of the T-year distribution of
income. Furthermore, let Gt and µt be the Gini coefﬁcient and the mean of the distribution of income in year t. To
arrive at a measure of mobility, it appears useful to introduce the “natural” decomposition of the Gini coefﬁcient (see










with strict equality if and only if all individuals maintain their position within the distribution of annual income in all
years. The T-year inequality is strictly less than the weighted average of the inequality within the separate years unless
no individual position shifts take place (i.e., complete immobility). Thus, when individuals do change their annual












is an appropriate measure of mobility. M takes its minimum value zero if and only if there is no mobility. The
maximum attainable value of one occurs when complete equality in the distribution of the T-year incomes arises from
income mobility. The mobility index M provides guidance to the second of our questions, namely what is the ordering
of countries with respect to income mobility.
Of course, this mobility index is analogous to the Shorrocks mobility indices. However, if income rankings are
constant over, say, s consecutive years, but the relative incomes of some units change over time, the Gini-based index
(2) registers no mobility, whereas the Shorrocks measures suggest income mobility has taken place.
The Shorrocks approach has previously been used by e.g., Björklund (1993) who used the coefﬁcient of variation
to deﬁne a measure of income mobility, while Aaberge and Wennemo (1993) and Gustafsson (1994) used the Gini
coefﬁcient as basis for measuring income mobility. Burkhauser and Poupore (1997) used both the Gini and the Theil
index of inequality.
83 Income inequality and mobility
We start the presentation of our results by looking at inequality of annual incomes. Figure 1(a) shows the time-series
of our Gini coefﬁcient for earnings for Sample 1, Figure 1(c) the same information for market income, and Figure 1(e)
the same information for disposable income (these data are also shown in Table A 9). Further, the time-series of
inequality for earnings, market income and disposable income for Sample 2 are shown in Figure 1(b), 1(d) and 1(f)
(see also Table A 10).
[Figure 1 about here.]
In both samples and with all three income concepts, the United States has much higher inequality than the Scan-
dinavian countries. For earnings, the difference in the Ginis between United States and the Scandinavian countries
exceeded 0.1 during the years 1980–1990 (Figure 1(a)). The differences are of comparable orders of magnitude for
disposable income and market income.6 There is also a marked trend in inequality of all income concepts.7 Both of
these ﬁndings are in line with earlier research and lend credibility to our choices of populations and income concepts;
e.g., the discrepancy between the United States on one hand and Sweden and Norway on the other has been found
in analyses of the LIS data (see e.g. Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997). That inequality increased substantially in the
United States throughout the 1980s is well established.
The differences between the Scandinavian countries are small compared to the differences between these countries
and the United States. The largest inter-Scandinavian differences are found for market income in the last two years of
Sample 2 when the differences between Sweden and Norway are .07. For no other income concept or sample does the
difference exceed .05.
[Table 1 about here.]
By comparing the inequality of market and disposable income, we also get an estimate of the equalizing effect of
taxes and child allowances, albeit under the assumption of no behavioral responses. Our results indicate that taxes and
transfers in Norway and the United States lead to the by-far greatest reduction in inequality. The difference between
the Gini coefﬁcient of market and disposable income clusters around .07 for Norway and the United States in Sample
2. The difference in Sweden is around .04, whereas in Denmark the differences are smaller.8 It should be be kept in
mind, though, that a larger number of transfers are included in disposable income in Norway and in the United States
than in the other two countries. Moreover, the U.S. transfers are in general means-tested and are therefore strongly
redistributive as measured by the ﬁrst-order incidence method.
[Table 2 about here.]
9We continue with comparing single-year inequality with multi-year inequality, our Question 1. Panel A of Table 1
contains the numbers for Sample 1 and Panel B those for Sample 2. For Sample 1 the results are quite clear; inequality
is highest in the United States for all income concepts and the differences against the Scandinavian countries are fairly
large. There is, however, a slight tendency for the differences to be smaller when incomes are averaged over several
years than in single-year inequality comparisons. For example, the difference in the Gini coefﬁcients between the
UnitedStatesandDenmarkoftheelevenyearaverageof disposableincomeis.10, butaround.12forannualdisposable
income. The differences between the Scandinavian countries are relatively small and their ordering depends on the
income concept. The pattern for Sample 2 is similar in the sense that inequality is higher for the United States than for
the Scandinavian countries.
An interesting ﬁnding is that the equalizing impacts of taxes and transfers, in the mechanical sense used above,
are of similar magnitudes when the time period is extended from 1 to 5 or 11 years. This means that extending the
accounting period does not deprive the “welfare state” of its equalizing effect.
Finally, we turn to the comparison of income mobility, our Question 2. The numbers in Panel A of Table 2 for the
1980–90 period suggest that mobility of earnings is lower in the United States than in the Scandinavian countries. By
contrast, mobility of market and disposable income is higher in the United States than in Denmark. However, mobility
in the distribution of market and disposable income in Sweden is higher than in the United States. Turning to Panel
B of Table 2, we can see that the mobility indices, as expected, are lower for the 1986–90 period. The ordering of
countries with respect to earnings mobility is different in this period, but the cross-country differences are very small.
It should noted that mobility ordering by market and disposable income is consistent across the two periods, in
the sense that no ordering of countries in the 1980-90 analysis is changed in the 1986-90 period. E.g., Sweden is
more mobile on market and disposable income than the United States, which in turn is more mobile on market and
disposable income than Denmark. The estimated mobility indices for Sample 2 suggest that the United States has less
mobility than Sweden and Norway, followed only by Denmark.
We are somewhat surprised to see that mobility in the distribution of disposable income is higher than in that
of market income for all countries, except the United States, in both samples. We had expected that the “welfare
state” in terms of taxes and transfers would smooth income over longer periods and thus reduce mobility even more
for disposable income than for market income. In the light of these results, this does not appear to be the case. To
understand this particular aspect of our results requires further study. One possible reason could be that we do not
adjust incomes to reﬂect changes in, e.g., the number of children living in the household, a possibility we examine in
our sensitivity analysis.
10Sensitivity analyses
There is always a risk in a study of this type that the conclusions are sensitive to some speciﬁc choices. We have
chosen to study whether the following issues, if handled differently, would lead us to draw different conclusions:
1. whether restricting the sample to only men, rather than both men and women would alter the pattern of earnings
inequality and mobility;
2. whether the restriction to only treat married couples as families (and hence aggregate their income), rather than
to similarly treat cohabiting couples, in combination with not using a traditional equivalence scale affects our
results;
3. whethertheinequality andmobility rankingsof theUnitedStatesissensitivetothe inclusionofracialminorities;
4. whether the treatment of unemployment beneﬁts as part of earnings inﬂuences the extent of earnings inequality
and mobility in the United States.
We deal with each of these questions in turn.
[Table 3 about here.]
There are larger inter-country differences in the patterns of female than in male labor force participation. These
differences affect both inequality and mobility. Instead of attempting to control for different sources of mobility, we
compare the mobility of male earnings in the four countries. This comparison is likely to be less sensitive to the
interaction of inter-country differences in male and female labor markets, work-related public policies and our sample
selection criteria.
In Table 3, we show the inequality and mobility indices of earnings estimated only for males. The ranking of
countries by earnings inequality is similar to that found for the sample of all positive earners, except that the earnings
of men are slightly more equal in Norway than in Sweden. The ordering of countries with respect to mobility is
perhaps more interesting. It turns out that the mobility of male earnings in the United States is less than in Denmark
and Norway in both time periods, while Sweden turns out to have slightly lower earnings mobility than the United
States.
[Table 4 about here.]
We were surprised by the fact that the mobility of both market and disposable income were so high in the Scandi-
navian countries. One possible explanation could be that cohabitation without formal marriage is fairly common in the
Scandinavian countries. Our choice to restrict the pooling of husband’s and wife’s income to legally married couples
11and treat two cohabiting persons as forming two families would tend to overstate income inequality and mobility.9
Also, our choice to assign one half of the market and disposable income of a couple to each spouse departs from
conventional analyses, where equivalent income is deﬁned in terms of the whole family.
In order to address these issues, we show in Table 4 for three of our countries – Norway, Sweden and the United
States – long-run income inequality and mobility indices obtained when treating cohabiters as being married and
dividing the family income variables by the square root of family size – a commonly used equivalence scale. The
inequality of long-run income is always higher when we equivalize using the square root scale and treat cohabiters as
married couples. The differences are substantial. For instance, in the 1980-1990 sample in the U.S. the long-run Gini
was .334 compared to .305 in our main analysis (see Table 1). However, the ordering of countries is not affected by
this change in methods. The mobility indices are estimated to be lower than in the main analysis (with the exception
of Norway 1986–1990). However, the mobility ordering of countries is unaffected by this sensitivity check. Thus,
cross-national differences in the prevalence of marriage and cohabiting and the choice of equivalence scale do not lead
us to revise our main results.
[Table 5 about here.]
It is also possible that the results for the United States are driven by differences in population composition. In
particular, the U.S. population is more heterogeneous than the populations of the Scandinavian countries, and racial
minorities in the United States are economically disadvantaged. This heterogeneity may account for the observed
higher inequality and lower mobility in the United States, but is difﬁcult to control for.10 However, we can examine
whether the exclusion of racial minorities would alter our results. Speciﬁcally, we include in this sensitivity analysis
only those individuals who in every sample year lived in a household with a white head.
The results in Table 5 do not lend much support to the thesis that our results are driven by the inclusion of racial
minorities. The inequality of all income variables is somewhat lower in both time periods than for the main analysis,
but the differences are at most around .015. Inequality of all income variables in the United States is well above that
in the Scandinavian countries. Income mobility among whites is slightly larger than for the whole population. The
differences are small and in only one case, that of earnings in 1986–1990, is the ranking of the United States changed.
Recall that data sources in the Scandinavian countries do not allow us to separate unemployment beneﬁts from
earnings. The PSID does not record unemployment beneﬁts as a separate variable for the spouse before 1985, at
which point we do include it (it is included for the head throughout the sample period). Our U.S. earnings data
differ in this respect from both what is customary in U.S. studies (which do not include unemployment beneﬁts in
earnings) and how we have deﬁned earnings in the Scandinavian countries (which do include unemployment beneﬁts
in earnings). This naturally raises some questions about the sensitivity of the inequality and mobility of earnings in
the United States.
12We examine this issue by deﬁning two earnings variables for the U.S. data, one which includes unemployment
beneﬁts and one which does not. Further, we estimate the inequality and mobility indices for both of these variables
for the sample as deﬁned “normally”, i.e., including both men and women, and for the sample consisting solely of
men. The results for annual inequality are shown in Figure 2 and for mobility and inequality of average income in
Table 6.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Looking at Figure 2, we see that the inclusion of unemployment beneﬁts has a negligible effect on the magnitude
of earnings inequality in the United States. The series which include and exclude unemployment beneﬁts appear to be
closely related. This does not preclude that the inequality of average income and/or mobility would be affected by the
discrepancy in the deﬁnition of earnings. As Table 6 shows, however, the sample deﬁnition matters much more than
the treatment of unemployment beneﬁts. The differences in the Gini coefﬁcients of average income are in the third
decimal and are small, and the differences in the mobility indices are negligible. Mobility, as measured by the Gini
mobility index, appears to be lower for men than for men and women combined.
[Table 6 about here.]
Interpreting mobility indices
Interpreting the magnitudes of the estimated mobility, or inequality, indices is not easy. Are the differences between
annual and long-run inequality indices small or large? To form some idea of what a particular level of mobility leads
to, we compare inequality in the observed distribution with a hypothetical distribution that has no mobility but has
the same level of inequality in each year. In order to keep this illustration of the effects of mobility brief and as the
mobility estimates from different countries were fairly similar, we only present results on earnings over the period
1980–1990 in Norway.
Recall that by deﬁnition, there is no mobility if the annual rank ordering of each individual in the income dis-
tribution remains the same throughout the time period. Based on the actual Norwegian earnings distributions from
1980–1990, we construct the set of immobile distributions by assigning the lowest earnings in every year to the “poor-
est” individual (measured in terms of long-run earnings), the second lowest to the second “poorest”, and so on. This
procedure keeps the distributions of annual income unchanged, but it attachesthe observed annual incomes to different
individuals. Aggregating these hypothetical distributions over time leads to a distribution of over-time average income
that is different from what is observed. By comparing the observed and hypothetical distribution of over-time average
income we get an idea of the economic signiﬁcance of the magnitude of estimated mobility.
13We simplify the comparison by looking at the mean income of every income decile group in the two distributions.
The hypothetical distribution of annual earnings over the 1980–1990 period is displayed in Table 7. The comparison
of the observed and the hypothetical distribution of average annual earnings demonstrates that observed mobility in
Norway during the 1980–1990 period had a substantialeffect on the bottom decilebut a modest effect on the remaining
deciles. Comparedtothehypotheticalimmobile distribution, thebottomdecilegained38percentandtheseconddecile
gained almost 8 percent. The top decile lost 3.3 percent and the ninth decile 1.4 percent. The remaining deciles lost
less than one percent. The Gini coefﬁcient of the immobile hypothetical distribution was 7 percent higher than that of
the observed distribution.
[Table 7 about here.]
Thus, when the mobility index takes values around or below 0.1, which is the case in our study, we tentatively
conclude that income mobility among the adult population is quite low and has only modest effects on the overall
distribution of income. However, income mobility can have large results at the tails of the distribution, in particular
at the bottom. Rank changes at the bottom end of the distribution had a substantial impact on the mean income of the
lowest decile group, suggesting that income mobility may be greater at the bottom of the distribution than elsewhere.
4 Relative income changes – micro level analyses
To better understand why countries with very different levels of inequality have such similar levels of inequality-
reducing mobility, we take a closer look at the micro-level income changes in each country. In the above analysis,
income rank changes equalize the multi-year distribution of income relative to that of annual income. The fact that the
country differences in multi-year income inequality were only slightly less than in single-year inequality suggests that
rank changes are not much more common in the United States. As U.S. income differences are greater, the changes in
incomes for a given rank may be quite large. We therefore examine in this section changes in relative income within
countries.
In order to keep things tractable, we examine two income deﬁnitions in two periods, namely earnings in 1980–90
and disposable income in 1986–90. In this analysis, we include unemployment beneﬁts in earnings for all countries.
We deﬁne a variable that measures the change in relative income for each individual between year t






























n is average income in year t. Thus, the average of d equals by deﬁnition zero. The distribution of
d, however, can and does vary between years and countries.
14We summarize for each country the distribution by the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile of d in each year. The
distribution of changes in relative earnings are shown to the left and that of disposable income to the right in Figure 3).
Displaying individual income mobility in this way reveals some differences between the countries. The 25th percentile
of the change in relative earnings is slightly lower and the 50th percentile a little higher in the United States than in
Denmark and Sweden. The 75th percentile is clearly higher, suggesting the distribution of d is wider in the United
States and that it has a fatter right-hand tail. The same pattern is present for the change in relative disposable income
between 1986 and 1990.
[Figure 3 about here.]
To gain insight into the kind of states and events that are associated with changes in an individual’s relative income,
















where, in addition to controls for age and its square, the covariates Zi;t
￿ 1
￿t are indicators representing changes of
marital status (married at t
￿ 1 and not married at t, not married t
￿ 1 and married at t, not married t
￿ 1 and not
married at t) and analogously changes of employment state (employed or not employed).11 Further, the individual
speciﬁc constant u, which we treat as a random effect, captures the inter-temporal covariance of relative earnings or
disposable income.12 The regression coefﬁcients d have a simple interpretation in all countries, in that they measure
the average change in relative income that is associated with the change in the status of an individual, such as divorce
(married in t
￿ 1 to not married in t).
We estimate the parameters in equation 4 using the Generalized Estimating Equations [GEE] approach, a lon-
gitudinal extension of GLIM (Zeger and Liang, 1986). The GEE estimates are robust to misspeciﬁcations of the
inter-temporal covariance structure of the errors. The purpose of the present exercise is to gain insight in what covari-
ates are associated with large or small changes in relative income. While it is possible that a ﬁxed-effect formulation
would be useful, doing so would throw away information of this descriptive nature. It would, for instance, not be
possible to compare the average changes in relative income between, say, those who are employed in both years with
those who are unemployed in both years if a ﬁxed effects formulation were to be used. Further, these processes may
be very different for men and women, so rather than controlling for gender, we estimate separate regressions.13 The
results for earnings in 1980-1990 were quite similar to those we obtained for disposable income in 1986-1990. As
Norway can only be included in the latter case, we present in Table 8 results for disposable income only.14
[Table 8 about here.]
15Turning to the estimation results, we see that becoming unemployed is associated with negative relative income
changes for males. The magnitude of this change is by far the largest for the U.S. For Norway and Sweden, the
coefﬁcient is insigniﬁcant. Ceasing to be unemployed is associated with an increase in income in Denmark and the
U.S. Remaining out of employment is associated with an income decline in Denmark and little change in the others.
Divorce is for U.S. males associated with little change in income, while marrying and remaining single are associated
with declines. Divorce is associated with fairly large increases in the relative incomes of Norwegian and Swedish men
while marrying is associated with large declines. In Denmark, effects are small and mostly insigniﬁcant, although
marrying is associated with income increases.
Employment changes are for U.S. women associated with similar but smaller changes than for men. In Denmark,
Norway and Sweden, changes in labor market status are for women associated with few signiﬁcant changes in relative
income. The marital status indicators are small and insigniﬁcant for Denmark. Divorce is associated with an income
decline in Norway but an increase in the U.S. Marrying is, on the other hand, associated with increases in relative
income in Norway and Sweden but with a decline in the U.S. There is little difference in changes in relative incomes
between those who remain married and those who remain unmarried. Denmark is, again, an exception to this, although
the coefﬁcients are small (remaining married is positive for men but negative for women). In interpreting these results,
however, we need to keep in mind that children are here treated as being costless. Including the costs of children
would likely lead to quite different assessments of the costs of divorce. A detailed examination of this issue is,
however, beyond the scope of the present paper.
Our regression analysis of changes in relative disposable income resembles the ones for the United States in
Duncan and Morgan (1981) and for Sweden in Fritzell (1990). Duncan and Morgan regressed the annual growth rate
from 1971 to 1978 of needs-adjusted family income on, inter alia, family and labor market events. Fritzell regressed
the annual growth rate from 1973 to 1980 in needs-adjusted family income on similar events.15 However, because
Duncan and Morgan also included some attitudinal variables, the results are not comparable between the countries.
Our results for the United States are the same as in Duncan and Morgan regarding labor market events, but deviate
somewhat regarding family events. Fritzell obtained stronger effects for labor market events than we do, and his
results for family events deviate from ours. We note, though, that these two studies used information on the numbers
of children to adjust for the needs of the family.
5 Discussion and concluding comments
Our results can be summarized brieﬂy. Firstly, we ﬁnd that the ordering of countries by inequality of annual income
by and large remains unchanged when the accounting period is extended up to 11 years (1980-1990). United States
16is by far the most unequal country even for this longer period. Secondly, no unequivocal ordering arises from the
comparisons of income mobility between countries. For the shorter period (1986 to 1990), the United States comes
third in the mobility ordering for both market and disposable income. In the longer period (Sample 1), the United
States has higher mobility for earnings. Sweden seems to have the highest mobility when it comes to market and
disposable income. Thirdly, changes in labor force and marital status are associated with substantially larger changes
in relative income in the U.S. than in the Scandinavian countries.
It appears that in all the countries we study, there is quite little income mobility as measured by the reduction in
inequalityonextendingtheaccountingperiod. Thissuggeststhatalengtheningoftheaccountingperiod ofincomewill
only have minor effects on inter-country differences in income inequality. The differences that arise within countries
of lengthening the accounting period are modest compared to the magnitude of inter-country differences. The result
that the United States, despite high cross-sectional inequality is not the country with the highest level of such income
mobility is similar to the ﬁndings of Burkhauser and Poupore (1997) and Burkhauser et al. (1998). These conclude,
using methods that are slightly different from ours, that Germany and the United States have “remarkably similar”
mobility patterns over the period 1983 to 1988. This conclusion holds for both earnings and measures that are closer
to disposable income. Further, in comparing mobility of family-size adjusted disposable income between Sweden
and the United States, Fritzell (1990) found a remarkable similarity among between the two countries. He studied
mobility in Sweden using mobility tables from 1973 to 1980 and compared his results with those obtained by Duncan
and Morgan (1981) for the U.S: from 1971 to 1978. OECD (1996) compares earnings inequality and mobility in a
larger set of countries. They ﬁnd quite different results depending on what deﬁnition and measure of mobility is used.
No unambiguous ordering arises from that study, either.
In order to gain insights into the mechanisms that underlie income mobility, we examined the distribution of ﬁrst
differences in earnings and disposable income relative to their annual averages. The distribution of these changes in
relative earnings and income turn out to be more dispersed in the United States, implying greater changes in relative
income from year to year than in the Scandinavian countries. Our approach to modeling the changes in relative income
suggests that changes in unemployment and marital status are in the United States associated with fairly large changes
in relative earnings and income. Changes in labor force status lead to similar but smaller shifts in relative income in
the Scandinavian countries. The pattern of income shifts associated with changes in marital status is more variable,
although suchshifts are again largest in the United States. The framework we use is quite simple and should be thought
of as indicative. Clearly, much can be learned from further modeling of the income process.
Our inquiry has also highlighted the data problems involved in comparative research like this. We regard improve-
ments of the basic sources of income data as an important task for future work. The treatment of capital income
should be improved and there is a need to obtain better data on other household members and their incomes. We are
17also concerned about household deﬁnitions. In the Scandinavian countries, it has become increasingly common to
live together without being married, or marry after a long period of non-marital cohabitation. Potentially, this might
create spurious income mobility in our data. However, our sensitivity test suggests that this is not a major source of
cross-country differences in mobility.
Another data quality issue is whether our comparisons are ﬂawed by the fact that the Scandinavian income data
stem from administrative records, primarily tax registers, whereas the U.S. data stem from interviews. If random
measurement error is greater in the U.S. data than in the data from the Scandinavian countries, this would inﬂate the
estimated income mobility in the United States compared to the Scandinavian countries. One possibility that we have
not pursued would be to impose some model of measurement error on the Scandinavian data. The ﬁndings from the
PSID validation studies (e.g. Bound and Krueger, 1991) could be used for such a purpose.
Another important goal for future research is to further examine the sources and causes of income mobility. To
what extent is mobility explained by job displacements due to structural changes in the economy? To what extent do
earnings vary over time because of variations in labor supply over the life-cycle? Studies that address these types of
questions can help us decide what income mobility is “good” and what is “bad”.
We should emphasize, however, what we believe is an important ﬁnding. High levels of income inequality are
widely thought to reﬂect a high degree of income mobility and to thus be a sign of a dynamic economy. When we
measure mobility in terms of inequality-reducing rank changes (the Shorrocks approach using the Gini index), we ﬁnd
no evidence of a positive relationship between inequality and mobility. This lack of a pattern is in itself an important
result.
Mobility as measured by annual changes in relative income appears more widely dispersed in the United States.
Extending the accounting period this greater mobility does not, however, bring about a greater proportionate reduction
in annual inequality than in the Scandinavian countries. Understanding the mechanisms that link these two ﬁndings is
an interesting challenge for future research.
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[Table 9 about here.]
[Table 10 about here.]
22Notes
1Gardiner and Hills (1999) deﬁne different types of income trajectories using the ﬁrst four waves of the British
Household Panel. “Instable” trajectories account for at least 40–60 percent (depending on deﬁnition) of all cases.
2See his contribution to the stimulating discussion of the issue in Krelle and Shorrocks (1978).
3Fritzell (1990), Burkhauser and Poupore (1997), Burkhauser et al. (1998) and OECD (1996) are examples of
cross-national longitudinal income distribution comparisons. We discuss their ﬁndings in the concluding section of
this paper.
4Incomes are ﬁrst added up in the family and then censored at zero if they are negative.
5See e.g. Sen (1974) and Yaari (1988) for a normative justiﬁcation of using the Gini coefﬁcient as a measure of
income inequality.
6In judging whether these differences are “small” or “large”, the reader can use the property that the Gini coefﬁ-
cient equals half the expected income difference relative to the mean between two randomly drawn individuals in the
population.
7In looking at the trend in earnings inequality in the United States, it should be recalled that our sample is different
from commonly used samples. In particular, our sample differs from those in many other studies because we include
both men and women (most study men and women separately) and we restrict the analysis to a balanced panel of those
who had positive earnings in every sample year (rather than an unbalanced panel or series of cross-section).
8The differences we estimate for Sweden are only about one half as large as those estimated by Björklund et al.
(1995). The most likely reason for this discrepancy is that they take the number of children into account when
calculating equivalent income. In particular, the equalizing effect of child allowances is larger in doing so.
9Mobility would be higher both because transitory income shocks, if imperfectly correlated within couples, would
tend to be smaller relative to permanent components of income and in as far as cohabiting couples marry during the
observation period.
10See, however, Björklund and Freeman (1997) for an attempt to do that. In particular, the authors compared
earnings inequality of Swedish males living in Sweden with that of U.S. males who in the Census report having
Swedish ancestry. U.S. males of Swedish ancestry have more or less the same degree of inequality as other U.S.
males. The authors concludethat population heterogeneity is unlikely to account for much of the difference in earnings
inequality between the two countries.
2311Marital status is deﬁned as in the data in the previous sections. Employment status is in the Nordic countries
deﬁned by whether or not the individual has received unemployment beneﬁts. In the United States, we use the survey
answer on employment status. Thus, our deﬁnitions are slightly different and our results should be viewed with some
caution.
12Our estimated coefﬁcients are robust w.r.t. to misspeciﬁcations of the inter-temporal covariance structure. See
below.
13Standard F-test strongly reject that the coefﬁcients for men and women are equal.
14Results for changes in relative earnings 1980–1990 can be obtained from the authors on request.
15Fritzell also estimated models for absolute income changes and changes in the percentile rank of income.
24Figure 1 Gini coefﬁcients for annual income, Sample 1 (1980–1990) and Sample 2 (1986–1990)
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Source: Authors’ calculations from Danish, Norwegian, Swedish and U.S. longitudinal data.
Note: See section 2 for details on sample and variable deﬁnitions.
25Figure 2 The sensitivity of earnings inequality (Gini coefﬁcients) to inclusion and exclusionof unemployment beneﬁts






1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990
Earnings with unemployment benefits, only men
Earnings without unemployment benefits, only men
Earnings with unemployment benefits, both men and women
Earnings without unemployment benefits, both men and women
Source: Authors’ calculations from PSID data ﬁles.
Note: See section 2 for sample deﬁnition. For the variable “Earnings with unemployment beneﬁts”, UB and workers
compensation are available in only part of the sample years for the spouse. We include these in the earnings variable
when possible.
26Figure 3 The distribution of changes in relative income – earnings 1980-1990 and disposable income 1986-1990
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Source: Authors’ calculations from Danish, Norwegian, Swedish and U.S. longitudinal data.
Note: Graphs show the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of the annual distributions of the change in relative earnings
between t
￿ 1 and t in 1980-1990 (left column) and the change in relative disposable income between t
￿ 1 and t in
1986–1990 (right column). See equation 3 and text in section 2 for details on samples and variable deﬁnitions.
27Table 1 Gini coefﬁcients of over-time average income
Country Earnings Market income Disposable income
A. Sample 1 (1980–1990)
Denmark 0.220 0.219 0.204
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Norway 0.256 n.a. n.a.
(0.000)
Sweden 0.234 0.200 0.156
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
United States 0.378 0.368 0.305
(0.013) (0.010) (0.009)
B. Sample 2 (1986–1990)
Denmark 0.232 0.245 0.224
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Norway 0.278 0.263 0.197
(0.000) (0.007) (0.006)
Sweden 0.250 0.211 0.172
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
United States 0.389 0.383 0.321
(0.010) (0.007) (0.007)
Source: Authors’ calculations from Danish, Norwegian, Swedish and U.S. longitudinal data.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. n.a. = not available. See section 2 for details on sample and variable deﬁnitions.
28Table 2 Mobility indices
Country Earnings Market income Disposable income
A. Sample 1 (1980–1990)
Denmark 0.080 0.076 0.078
Norway 0.069 n.a. n.a.
Sweden 0.073 0.115 0.154
United States 0.065 0.097 0.092
B. Sample 2 (1986–1990)
Denmark 0.057 0.046 0.054
Norway 0.053 0.070 0.075
Sweden 0.045 0.071 0.097
United States 0.051 0.062 0.060
Source: Authors’ calculations from Danish, Norwegian, Swedish and U.S. longitudinal data.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. See section 2 for details on sample and variable deﬁnitions.
29Table 3 Male earnings inequality and mobility
Country Sample 1 (1980–1990) Sample 2 (1986–1990)
Average Gini Mobility Average Gini Mobility
Denmark 0.183 0.097 0.208 0.063
(0.002) (0.002)
Norway 0.192 0.090 0.221 0.066
(0.000) (0.000)
Sweden 0.200 0.078 0.250 0.045
(0.005) (0.004)
United States 0.336 0.080 0.357 0.055
(0.017) (0.013)
Source: Authors’ calculations from Danish, Norwegian, Swedish and U.S. longitudinal data.
Note: Standard errors of Gini coefﬁcients in parentheses. Samples include only men with positive earnings in sample
period. See text for deﬁnition of earnings and other sample restrictions.
30Table 4 Long-run income inequality and mobility treating cohabiters as married
Country Market income Disposable income
Average Gini Mobility Average Gini Mobility
A. Sample 1 (1980–90)
Sweden 0.232 0.130 0.222 0.129
(0.004) (0.004)
United States 0.392 0.096 0.334 0.086
(0.010) (0.010)
B. Sample 2 (1986–90)
Norway 0.264 0.074 0.198 0.082
(0.006) (0.006)
Sweden 0.251 0.063 0.216 0.068
(0.004) (0.003)
United States 0.429 0.061 0.363 0.055
(0.011) (0.011)
Source: Authors’ calculations from country data ﬁles.
Note: For the main results, couples had to be legally married, and we divided family income by the number of adults.
The numbers in this table stem from a sample where cohabiters are treated as being married and family income is
divided by the square root of family size.
31Table 5 Inequality of average income and mobility for households with white heads in the United States 1980–1990
and 1986–1990
Statistic Earnings Earnings of men Market income Disposable income
A. Sample 1. (1980–1990)
Gini 0.336 0.335 0.357 0.298
SE(Gini) (0.015) (0.018) (0.011) (0.010)
Mobility 0.112 0.080 0.103 0.096
B. Sample 2. (1986–1990)
Gini 0.358 0.353 0.368 0.311
SE(Gini) (0.010) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008)
Mobility 0.059 0.056 0.065 0.063
Source: Authors’ calculations from PSID data ﬁles.
Note: Standard errors of Gini coefﬁcients in parentheses. The sample only includes those persons who in every sample
year lived in a household with a white head. Other restrictions as for main results (see section 2).
32Table 6 The sensitivity of average earnings inequality and mobility to deﬁnition of earnings variable and sample in
the United States 1980–1990
Statistic Earnings without
unemployment ben-











Average Gini 0.342 0.340 0.336 0.335
Mobility 0.109 0.108 0.080 0.080
Source: Authors’ calculations from PSID data ﬁles.
Note: See section 2 for sample deﬁnition. For the variable “Earnings with unemployment beneﬁts”, UB and workers
compensation are available in only part of the sample years for the spouse. We include these in the earnings variable
when possible.
33Table 7 Observed and hypothetical sum of earnings by decile groups over the 1980–1990 period for Norway
Decile group Overall earnings 1980–1990
Observed Hypothetical Difference
1 5659 4105 -37.9
2 10285 9529 -7.9
3 13526 13322 -1.5
4 16277 16385 0.7
5 18253 18370 0.6
6 20018 20146 0.6
7 21928 22103 0.8
8 24323 24554 0.9
9 27882 28287 1.4
10 38946 40296 3.3
All 19710 19710 0.0
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Norwegian TAF ﬁles.
Note: The sum of the lowest actual annual earnings in each year deﬁnes the lowest earnings in the hypothetical
hypothetical distribution, the sum of the second lowest earnings the second lowest hypothetical earnings and so on.
34Table 8 Regression results – ﬁrst difference in relative disposable income 1986-1990, men and women
Covariate in t
￿ 1 t Denmark Norway Sweden U. S. Denmark Norway Sweden U. S.
Men Women
Intercept 0.131 0.239 0.128 0.005 0.145 0.200 0.151 0.029
(0.012) (0.113) (0.036) (0.061) (0.013) (0.118) (0.038) (0.042)
Age –0.005 –0.100 –0.005 0.003 –0.006 –0.099 –0.005 0.001
(0.001) (0.060) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.053) (0.002) (0.003)
Age2 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000





Employed Not employed –0.037 –0.076 –0.008 –0.174 –0.016 0.016 0.012 –0.137
(0.008) (0.071) (0.019) (0.029) (0.007) (0.069) (0.018) (0.036)
Not employed Employed 0.016 0.060 –0.027 0.091 –0.005 0.014 –0.037 0.037
(0.005) (0.065) (0.018) (0.020) (0.007) (0.058) (0.017) (0.020)
Not employed Not employed –0.018 –0.001 0.019 0.014 –0.006 0.034 0.006 –0.013





Married Not married –0.001 0.380 0.333 0.056 –0.003 –0.184 0.107 0.100
(0.023) (0.072) (0.028) (0.040) (0.022) (0.067) (0.063) (0.035)
Not married Married 0.032 –0.343 –0.202 –0.080 0.028 0.190 0.157 –0.075
(0.015) (0.055) (0.016) (0.029) (0.015) (0.061) (0.018) (0.029)
Not married Not married –0.004 0.003 0.002 –0.035 0.005 –0.004 –0.003 0.004
(0.002) (0.015) (0.004) (0.009) (0.002) (0.014) (0.004) (0.007)
Source: Authors’ calculations from Danish, Norwegian, Swedish and U.S. longitudinal data.
Note: Dependent variable is the annual change in relative disposable income (see equation 3) between t
￿ 1 and t. Parameters have
been estimated using GEE.
35Table 9 Gini coefﬁcients of annual income, Sample 1 (1980–1990)
Country Year Earnings Market income Disposable income
Gini SE(Gini) Gini SE(Gini) Gini SE(Gini)
Denmark 1980 0.239 (0.002) 0.193 (0.003) 0.185 (0.003)
1981 0.246 (0.002) 0.234 (0.004) 0.220 (0.004)
1982 0.239 (0.002) 0.232 (0.004) 0.217 (0.004)
1983 0.234 (0.002) 0.233 (0.004) 0.215 (0.004)
1984 0.234 (0.002) 0.238 (0.004) 0.219 (0.004)
1985 0.233 (0.002) 0.239 (0.004) 0.221 (0.004)
1986 0.238 (0.002) 0.237 (0.004) 0.221 (0.004)
1987 0.237 (0.002) 0.244 (0.004) 0.224 (0.004)
1988 0.238 (0.002) 0.247 (0.004) 0.232 (0.004)
1989 0.241 (0.002) 0.251 (0.004) 0.234 (0.004)
1990 0.249 (0.002) 0.256 (0.004) 0.245 (0.005)
N 11734 3336 3336
Norway 1980 0.294 (0.000) n.a. (n.a.) n.a. (n.a.)
1981 0.283 (0.000) n.a. (n.a.) n.a. (n.a.)
1982 0.279 (0.000) n.a. (n.a.) n.a. (n.a.)
1983 0.276 (0.000) n.a. (n.a.) n.a. (n.a.)
1984 0.273 (0.000) n.a. (n.a.) n.a. (n.a.)
1985 0.271 (0.000) n.a. (n.a.) n.a. (n.a.)
1986 0.268 (0.000) n.a. (n.a.) n.a. (n.a.)
1987 0.266 (0.000) n.a. (n.a.) n.a. (n.a.)
1988 0.269 (0.000) n.a. (n.a.) n.a. (n.a.)
1989 0.270 (0.000) n.a. (n.a.) n.a. (n.a.)
1990 0.282 (0.000) n.a. (n.a.) n.a. (n.a.)
N 705597 0 0
Sweden 1980 0.265 (0.005) 0.230 (0.004) 0.183 (0.004)
1981 0.254 (0.004) 0.226 (0.005) 0.186 (0.005)
1982 0.252 (0.004) 0.229 (0.004) 0.185 (0.004)
1983 0.252 (0.004) 0.229 (0.004) 0.190 (0.003)
1984 0.249 (0.004) 0.225 (0.004) 0.186 (0.003)
1985 0.246 (0.004) 0.221 (0.004) 0.179 (0.003)
1986 0.249 (0.004) 0.225 (0.004) 0.181 (0.003)
1987 0.247 (0.005) 0.225 (0.005) 0.182 (0.003)
1988 0.247 (0.004) 0.221 (0.004) 0.184 (0.003)
1989 0.250 (0.004) 0.223 (0.004) 0.191 (0.004)
1990 0.261 (0.005) 0.226 (0.005) 0.183 (0.003)
N 2834 3228 0
United States 1980 0.379 (0.008) 0.364 (0.012) 0.295 (0.011)
1981 0.376 (0.008) 0.363 (0.008) 0.286 (0.007)
1982 0.396 (0.012) 0.378 (0.008) 0.306 (0.007)
1983 0.393 (0.013) 0.377 (0.009) 0.311 (0.008)
1984 0.408 (0.015) 0.401 (0.012) 0.336 (0.012)
1985 0.406 (0.013) 0.402 (0.010) 0.336 (0.009)
1986 0.409 (0.016) 0.410 (0.010) 0.342 (0.010)
1987 0.416 (0.020) 0.426 (0.015) 0.359 (0.016)
1988 0.424 (0.021) 0.448 (0.015) 0.375 (0.016)
1989 0.416 (0.018) 0.450 (0.012) 0.367 (0.011)
1990 0.414 (0.012) 0.456 (0.009) 0.360 (0.008)
N 1939 3119 3119
Source: Authors’ calculations from Danish, Norwegian, Swedish and U.S. longitudinal data.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. n.a. = not available. See section 2 for details on sample and variable deﬁnitions.
36Table 10 Gini coefﬁcients of annual income, Sample 2 (1986–1990)
Country Year Earnings Market income Disposable income
Gini SE(Gini) Gini SE(Gini) Gini SE(Gini)
Denmark 1986 0.250 (0.002) 0.248 (0.004) 0.228 (0.003)
1987 0.242 (0.002) 0.253 (0.004) 0.229 (0.003)
1988 0.242 (0.002) 0.258 (0.004) 0.239 (0.003)
1989 0.245 (0.002) 0.261 (0.004) 0.240 (0.003)
1990 0.252 (0.002) 0.265 (0.003) 0.247 (0.004)
N 16811 5455 5455
Norway 1986 0.302 (0.000) 0.269 (0.006) 0.209 (0.006)
1987 0.291 (0.000) 0.271 (0.006) 0.205 (0.005)
1988 0.290 (0.000) 0.279 (0.006) 0.208 (0.006)
1989 0.288 (0.000) 0.299 (0.012) 0.226 (0.011)
1990 0.297 (0.000) 0.296 (0.008) 0.218 (0.008)
N 1307540 2047 2047
Sweden 1986 0.265 (0.004) 0.230 (0.004) 0.194 (0.003)
1987 0.260 (0.004) 0.229 (0.004) 0.191 (0.003)
1988 0.258 (0.004) 0.223 (0.004) 0.188 (0.003)
1989 0.260 (0.004) 0.227 (0.005) 0.193 (0.004)
1990 0.269 (0.004) 0.224 (0.004) 0.187 (0.003)
N 3606 3828 3828
United States 1986 0.404 (0.009) 0.390 (0.007) 0.327 (0.006)
1987 0.408 (0.012) 0.399 (0.009) 0.339 (0.010)
1988 0.412 (0.012) 0.413 (0.009) 0.350 (0.010)
1989 0.406 (0.010) 0.416 (0.008) 0.346 (0.007)
1990 0.408 (0.007) 0.423 (0.006) 0.346 (0.005)
N 5483 6712 6712
Source: Authors’ calculations from Danish, Norwegian, Swedish and U.S. longitudinal data.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. n.a. = not available. See section 2 for details on sample and variable deﬁnitions.
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